

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PORT L 00302 01 OF 03 310233Z
ACTION AF-08

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
AGR-05 AID-05 CIAE-00 COM-02 DODE-00 FEA-01 NSC-05
TRSY-02 USIA-06 /091 W
-----310323Z 075017 /20

R 301025Z MAR 77
FM AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6571
INFO CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 PORT LOUIS 0302

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AMGT PFOR US MP
SUBJECT: PARM -- ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT --
PART I

REF: STATE 038356; CERP 0001; PORT LOUIS 0252

PART I - POLICY ASSESSMENTS

A. U.S. INTERESTS

OUR PRINCIPAL LONG-TERM INTEREST IN MAURITIUS IS TO SEE
THE CONTINUATION IN POWER OF A GOVERNMENT THAT:

(1) WHILE GENUINELY NON-ALIGNED, IS FRIENDLY TO THE
UNITED STATES AND TO THE WESTERN WORLD IN GENERAL, WHICH IN
MAURITIUS IS MAINLY REPRESENTED BY (BESIDES THE U.S.) GREAT
BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE EEC;

(2) WILL NOT REORIENT ITS FOREIGN POLICY AND TRADE
RELATIONSHIPS IN DIRECTIONS THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE CLOSE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PORT L 00302 01 OF 03 310233Z

INTIMACY WITH OR SUBSERVIENCE TO THE SOVIET UNION, OR CHINA,
OR RADICAL AFRICAN OR ARAB COUNTRIES (E.G. LIBYA), WHICH WOULD
ENCOURAGE MAURITIUS TO TAKE POSTURES HOSTILE TO THE UNITED
STATES;

(3) MAINTAINS ITS DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER AND FULL
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AN AREA IN WHICH ITS RECORD HAS

BEEN A GOOD ONE (EXCEPTIONAL IN A THIRD WORLD COUNTRY), WITH FREE AND HONEST ELECTIONS, A FREE PRESS, AND INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, MULTIPLE PARTIES, NO REPRESSION IN RECENT YEARS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND REMARKABLE RACIAL HARMONY;

(4) GRANTS ACCESS TO THE U.S. NAVY FOR CALLS AT PORT LOUIS, ONE OF THE FEW GOOD AND AVAILABLE PORTS OF CALL IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, A FACTOR WHICH WILL GAIN IN IMPORTANCE IF AND WHEN MIDEASTFOR BECOMES A FLOTING COMMAND;

(5) WELCOMES U.S. INVESTMENT AND TRADE?

(6) CONCENTRATES ON THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF ITS PEOPLE AND NOT ON BUILDING A MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT OR ERECTING EXPENSIVE PRESTIGE PROJECTS;

(7) GIVES US A REASONABLE AND SYMPATHETIC HEARING WHEN WE SEEK ITS SUPPORT ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO US;

(8) WILL REFUSE TO PERMIT ANY FOREIGN POWER TO ESTABLISH A MILITARY BASE ON ITS TERRITORY, THUS CONTRIBUTING TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND EAST AFRICAN AREA.

B. OVERVIEW

THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF DECEMBER 1976, THE FIRST IN NINE YEARS, PRODUCED AN OUTCOME WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PORT L 00302 01 OF 03 310233Z

PROFOUNDLY AFFECTING U.S. - MAURITIAN RELATIONS OVER THE COURSE OF THE NEXT TWO YEARS. THE MARXIST OPPOSITION PARTY, THE MAURITIAN MILITANT MOVEMENT (MMM), WON AN UNEXPECTEDLY LARGE NUMBER OF SEATS (34), AS AGAINST A POORER SHOWING THAN ANTICIPATED BY THE TRADITIONAL RULING PARTY, LABOR, WHICH WON 28, AND THE FORMER OPPOSITION MAURITIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PMSD), WHICH TOOK 8. THE LATTER TWO PARTIES HAVE FORMED A COALITION TO RULE THE COUNTRY. WHILE SOME OF THE COALITION'S LEADERS ARE TALKING IN TERMS OF ITS SURVIVAL FOR FIVE YEARS, UNTIL THE NEXT SCHEDULED ELECTIONS, MOST OBSERVERS VIEW THE PRESENT SITUATION AS HIGHLY UNSTABLE AND UNLIKELY TO LAST OUT THE YEAR. A REGROUPING OF FORCES OR NEW ELECTIONS ARE PROBABLE.

THE FOUR MOST LIKELY DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE COMING TWO YEARS ARE DESCRIBED BELOW. THEY SEEM TO BE ABOUT EQUAL PROBABILITIES, THAT IS, EACH HAS ABOUT A 25 PERCENT CHANCE OF BEING REALIZED, AND AS PRESENTED THEY ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.

(1) NEW ELECTIONS, WHETHER FORCED OR CALLED, WILL STRENGTHEN THE PARLIAMENTARY POSITION OF THE PRESENT COALITION, AND THE LABOR PARTY MIGHT WIN A LARGE ENOUGH MAJORITY TO RULE ALONE. MANY OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT BY PICKING ITS CANDIDATES CAREFULLY LABOR COULD WIN ABOUT TEN MORE SEATS THEN IT DID IN DECEMBER. THIS CONTINGENCY WOULD BE THE MOST FAVORABLE POSSIBLE OUTCOME FOR U.S. INTERESTS.

(2) THE LABOR-PMSD COALITION COULD ENDURE FOR TWO YEARS OR LONGER. IT WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO MOVE LEFTWARD DOMESTICALLY, BUT NOT NECESSARILY INTERNATIONALLY, TO POSITION ITSELF FOR THE NEXT ELECTORAL ROUND, WHENEVER IT MIGHT COME. THIS OUTCOME WOULD BE TOLERABLE FOR US, BUT NOT IDEAL BECAUSE UNSTABLE.

(3) THE LABOR PARTY MIGHT BE FORCED INTO MAKING A COALITION WITH THE MMM, EITHER TO STAY IN POWER OR AS A RESULT OF INCONCLUSIVE ELECTIONS. THIS WOULD DRAG MAURITIUS TO THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 PORT L 00302 01 OF 03 310233Z

LEFT BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY, AND WOULD BE INIMICAL TO OUR INTERESTS BUT BY NO MEANS DISASTROUS.

(4) THE MMM COULD WIN A CLEAR MAJORITY IN A NEW ELECTORAL ROUND, WHICH WOULD BRING IT TO UNRESTRAINED POWER. THIS WOULD BE THE WORST POSSIBLE OUTCOME FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF U.S. INTERESTS.

THE FOURTH CONTINGENCY CAN BE DEALT WITH BRIEFLY HERE, BECAUSE SHOULD IT COME TO PASS, A REASSESSMENT OF OUR POLICIES AND PROGRAMS WOULD BE CALLED FOR. THE MMM IS A STRONGLY IDEOLOGICAL, PROCLAIMEDLY MARXIST PARTY. IT DENIES IT IS COMMUNIST, BUT IT IS CLEARLY PRO-SOVIET IN FOREIGN POLICY. IF IT CAME TO POWER AT THE LEAST IT WOULD ALIGN MAURITIUS WITH THE MOST RADICAL OF THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES (LIBYA, CUBA, MADAGASCAR, ALGERIA, MOZAMBIQUE) AND WOULD LOOSEN ITS TIES WITH THE WEST (UK, US, FRANCE, EEC). A MMM GOVERNMENT WOULD BE STRIDENT IN ITS CRITICISM OF THE U.S. IN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES OF ALL KINDS AND WOULD INCREASE THE PRESSURE AGAINST OUR NAVAL BASE ON DIEGO GARCIA.

IN DOMESTIC POLICY THE MMM IS TO THE LEFT OF THE SOCIALISTS, AND ITS COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND NORMS IS QUESTIONABLE. A MMM GOVERNMENT WOULD MOST LIKELY EVENTUALLY EXPERIENCE SEVERE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND WOULD TURN TO THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES FOR NECESSARY AID. IT IS CONCEIVABLE (THOUGH NOT PREDICTABLE) THAT A MMM GOVERNMENT WOULD TRADE BASE RIGHTS IN MAURITIUS FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE IF THE ECONOMY WENT INTO SERIOUS DECLINE. A MMM GOVERNMENT WOULD FURTHERMORE PROBABLY DEAL WITH OVERT POPULAR DISCONTENT BY USING REPRESSION, AND SUPPRESSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE

END RESULT COULD BE A MAURITIUS RULED BY AN AUTHORITARIAN
AND REPRESSIVE MARXIST REGIME CLOSELY ALIGNED WITH BUT NOT
INTEGRATED INTO THE SOVIET BLOC, RESEMBLING ANGOLA, SOMALIA
OR MOZAMBIQUE..

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 PORT L 00302 01 OF 03 310233Z

THE PPRESERVATION OF THE U.S. AND WESTERN POSITION IN
MAURITIUS REQUERES UT TO MAINTAIN A REASONABLY STRONG PRESENCE
HERE AND TO UNDERTAKE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE
FOR THIS SMALL COUNTRY THAT WOULD HELP STRENGTHEN THE PRESENT
GOVERNMENT, AND PARTICULARLY THE LABOR PARTY, SO THAT WHICH-
EVER OF THE FIRST THREE CONTINGENCIES DESCRIBED ABOVE COMES
ABOUT, THE POSITION OF ELEMENTS FRIENDLY TO US WILL BE
ENHANCED. THIS CALLS FOR A SMALL U.S. EMBASSY, WHICH IN FACT
TODAY IS SMALLER THAN THE EMBASSIES OF THE SOVIET UNION,
CHINA, THE UK AND FRANCE (AND PERHAPS UNIQUE IN THE WORLD IN
THIS REGARD). WE NEED TO MAINTAIN A STRONG CULTURAL PROGRAM,
MAKING MAXIMUM USE OF INTERNATIONAL VISITOR GRANTS TO GIVE
A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF INFLUENTIAL MAURITIANS PERSONAL
EXPOSURE TO THE UNITED STATES.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PORT L 00302 02 OF 03 310246Z

ACTION AF-08

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
AGR-05 AID-05 CIAE-00 COM-02 DODE-00 FEA-01 NSC-05
TRSY-02 USIA-06 /091 W

-----310310Z 075220 /20

R 301025Z MAR 77

FM AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6572

INFO CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 PORT LOUIS 0302

WE ALSO NEED TO ENLARGE OUR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM --
WHICH TODAY CONSISTS SOLELY OF \$30,000 A YEAR OF SELF-HELP
FUNDS -- IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE U.S. AS WELL AS

OTHER WESTERN DONORS IS SUPPORTING THE PRESENT FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT AND IS COMMITTED TO ASSISTING IN THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MAURITIAN PEOPLE. THE PL480 FOOD-FOR-WORK AID OF THE PAST AND THE SMALL PEACE CROPS CONTINGENT HAVE BOTH BEEN PHASED OUT, WHICH MAKES IT APPARENT TO ALL THAT WE ARE DOING LESS TO HELP MAURITIUS TODAY THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE INDEPENDENCE. IT IS TRUE OF COURSE THAT MAURITIUS HAS RECEIVED IMPORTANT AID FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS WHICH ENJOY MAJOR U.S. SUPPORT, BUT THIS ASSISTANCE, OR RATHER ITS SOURCE, IS LESS VISIBLE TO THE MAURITIAN POPULACE. WHAT WE NOW NEED TO DO, IN EFFECT, IS RESTORE AN AID PROGRAM OF SOME SIGNIFICANCE TO CARRY OUT OUR RECOMMENDATION THAT WE GIVE GREATER ATTENTION TO SUPPORTING THE PRESENT MODERATE MAURITIAN GOVERNMENT BILATERALLY.

IN ADDITION TO CULTURAL EXCHANGES AND BILATERAL ASSISTANCE, WE NEED TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE GOM'S SPECIAL INTERESTS AND CONCERNS VIS-A-VIS THE U.S. THESE ARE:

(1) CONTINUED ACCESS TO THE U.S. SUGAR MARKET, AT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PORT L 00302 02 OF 03 310246Z

PREFERENTIAL PRICES IF POSSIBLE (SUGAR IS ABSLOUTELY VITAL TO THE MAURITIAN ECONOMY, AND THERE IS NO EASY SUBSTITUTE FOR MAURITIUS' SHARE OF THE U.S. MARKET);

(2) U.S. INVESTMENT IN AND TRADE WITH MAURITIUS, PARTICULARLY INVESTMENTS THAT CREATE JOBS;

(3) CONTINUED HELP WITH FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS, WHICH HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL HERE;

(4) A REASONABLY STRONG DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN PORT LOUIS, TO HELP BALANCE THE SOVIETS, CHINESE AND ARABS AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE COUNTRY'S NON-ALIGNED IMAGE;

(5) APPRECIATION OF THE GOM'S CONCERN OVER THE BUILD-UP OF THE U.S. BASE ON DIEGO GARCIA, FORMERLY ITS TERRITORY, WHICH MAKES THE GOM VULNERABLE TO OPPOSITION ATTACKS; ACCOMMODATION TO THE GOM'S CONCERNS TOTHE EXTENT OUR STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS PRMIT.

FINALLY, THERE ARE TWO SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS WHICH SHOULD RECEIVE OUR POLICY ATTENTION OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS. THE FIRST IS THE PORT OF PORT LOUIS, WHICH COULD BECOME MORE IMPORTANT OR LESS IMPORTANT IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH MAURITIUS. SHOULD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW "FLOATING" COMMAND FOR MIDEASTFOR COME ABOUT, THERE WILL BE A NEED FOR LONGER AND MORE FREQUENT PORT CALLS AT PORT LOUIS FOR THE U.S. NAVY. THE GOM HAS WELCOMED THESE VISITS IN THE PAST,

AND IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO DO SO IN THE FUTURE, PROVIDED THERE IS NOT A DRASTIC CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT HERE. (PORT LOUIS 125 - EXDIS PRESENTS A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THIS ASPECT.) THE NEW NEED TO RELY ON PORT LOUIS TO A GREATER EXTENT OF COURSE TRANSLATES INTO GREATER ATTENTION TO MAINTAINING GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS THAN THE OTHER CONSIDERATIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE WOULD ACCOUNT FOR ALONE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PORT L 00302 02 OF 03 310246Z

CONVERSELY, SHOULD THE SOVIETS RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE PRESIDENT'S RECENTLY ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO RAISE WITH THEM A MOVE TOWARD MUTUAL MILITARY RESTRAINT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, THE DIEGO GARCIA BASE, ACCESS TO PORT LOUIS, AND GOM CONCERN OVER GREAT POWER RIVALRY IN THIS AREA WOULD ALL TEND TO DIMINISH AS POTENTIAL ISSUES OR IRRITANTS IN OUR RELATIONS WITH MAURITIUS.

THE SECOND SPECIAL CONSIDERATION IN HUMAN RIGHTS. THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. AT THE PRESENT TIME THERE IS NO HUMAN RIGHTS "PROBLEM" IN MAURITIUS. TO THE CONTRARY, MAURITIUS IS ONE OF THE FEW THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES WHICH CAN DISPLAY ITS HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD WITH PRIDE AND COMPARE ITSELF FAVORABLY WITH THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES OF THE WEST. THE GOM'S RECORD HAS NOT BEEN PERFECT, FOR IN THE 1971-72 PERIOD THERE WERE MORE OR LESS ARBITRARY ARRESTS AND JAILINGS, REPRESSION OF LEFT-WING AGITATION (BY PRESENT LEADERS OF THE MMM) AND A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND PRESS CENSORSHIP, AS WELL AS THE POSTPONEMENT OF ELECTIONS (BY CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT). THE STATE OF EMERGENCY STILL EXISTS. BUT ON PAPER ONLY, AS IT HAS NO REAL EFFECT; PRESS CENSORSHIP HAS BEEN ABOLISHED, THERE ARE NO POLITICAL PRISONERS, NO ARBITRARY ARRESTS OR DETENTIONS, NO TORTURE, AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ARE IN FULL FLOWER, WITH THE COUNTRY JUST HAVING ENJOYED FREE, HONEST AND VIOLENCE-FREE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, WHICH WERE WON BY THE OPPOSITION.

UNDERSTANDABLY THE USG HAS THUS FAR LAUNCHED ITS EFFORT IN FAVOR OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY CALLING ATTENTION TO COUNTRIES WHERE THE GOVERNMENT'S RECORD HAS BEEN BAD, AND ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO CUT SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO EGREGIOUS CASES. IN A SECOND PHASE IT WOULD BE EQUALLY APPROPRIATE TO REWARD DESERVING COUNTRIES WITH OUTSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS RECORDS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT WE ARE NOT JUST BEING NEGATIVE AND CARPING, BUT THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO GIVE EXEMPLARY ENCOURAGEMENT AS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 PORT L 00302 02 OF 03 310246Z

WELL.

AS THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID IN HIS STATEMENT TO THE HUMPHREY SUBCOMMITTEE (STATE 049664): "IN SOME INSTANCES OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS MAY BE CURTAILED, BUT WE MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT TO BE EVEN-HANDED, WE SHOULD NOT JUST PENALIZE BUT ALSO INSPIRE, PERSUADE, AND REWARD." IN IMPLEMENTING THIS PRINCIPLE, MAURITIUS WOULD BE AN OBVIOUS AND JUSTIFIED CANDIDATE TO BE RECIPIENT OF SOME OF THE "REWARD."

C. OBJECTIVES, COURSES OF ACTION, AND ISSUES

(1) OBJECTIVES

BASED ON THE PRESENTATION IN THE SECTION ABOVE, U.S. OBJECTIVES IN MAURITIUS CAN BE BRIEFLY SUMMARIZED AS MAINTAINING OUR CURRENT FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT NOW IN POWER, HELPING IT BUILD ITS STRENGTH AND APPEAL TO THE ELECTORATE BY CONTRIBUTING WITHIN OUR LIMITED RESOURCES TO THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEOPLE, ENCOURAGING THE PRESERVATION OF THE COUNTRY'S DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES AND INSTITUTIONS, AND PROJECTING TO THE MAURITIAN POPULACE A FAVORABLE IMAGE OF THE UNITES STATES, ITS POLICIES, INSTITUTIONS, PRACTICES AND GOALS.

THESE OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE PURSUED BY FOLLOWING ALL THE COURSES OF ACTIONS SET FORTH BELOW, REGARDLESS OF WHICH OF THE FIRST THREE CONTINGENCIES DESCRIBED IN THE "OVERVIEW" COMES TO PASS. IN CASE OF THE FOURTH CONTINGENCY (A MMM GOVERNMENT TAKES POWER) A REASSESSMENT OF OUR OVERALL POLICY, OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION WOULD BE NECESSARY.

(2) COURSES OF ACTION

(A) MAINTAIN A SAMLL BUT STROHGLY-STAFFED EMBASSY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 PORT L 00302 02 OF 03 310246Z

OF THE PRESENT SIZE TO PROVIDE A U.S. PRESENCE, WHICH IS BOTH IN OUR INTEREST AND IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOM.

(B) EXCHANGE VIEWS FREQUENTLY WITH THE GOM AT ALL LEVELS AND WITH INFLUENTIAL PEOPLE OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT. TO THIS END IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE A HIGH-LEVEL USG VISITOR COME TO MAURITIUS ONCE OR TWICE A YEAR TO EXCHANGE VIEWS -- AS, FOR EXAMPLE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFLELE DID WHEN HE BRIEFED

PRIME MINISTER RAMGOOLAM (AS OAU CHAIRMAN) ON THE
RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS.

ADP211

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PORT L 00302 03 OF 03 310236Z
ACTION AF-08

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
AGR-05 AID-05 CIAE-00 COME-00 DODE-00 FEA-01
NSC-05 TRSY-02 USIA-06 /089 W
-----310312Z 075098 /20

R 301025Z MAR 77
FM AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6573
INFO CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 PORT LOUIS 0302

(C) EXPAND OUR CULTURAL/EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM
TO INCREASE THE FLOW OF INTERNATIONAL VISITORS AND
OTHER GRANTEES TO THE U.S. TO 20 TO 25 PER YEAR.

(D) ESTABLISH AND DEVELOP A MODEST READING ROOM IN
PORT LOUIS TO SERVE AS A FOCUS FOR OUR CULTURAL AND
INFORMATIONAL EFFORT.

(E) CONTINUE TO PLACE AS MUCH USIA MATERIAL AS POSSIBLE
IN MAURITIAN MEDIA, PARTICULARLY MBC TV AND RADIO.

(F) DOUBLE THE SIZE OF OUR CURRENT AID SELF-HELP FUND
PROGRAM TO ABOUT \$60,000 PER YEAR IN ORDER TO FINANCE
A LARGER NUMBER OF PROJECTS OF DIRECT HELP TO
MAURITIAN COMMUNITIES AND DISADVANTAGED PEOPLE (E.G.
THE RODRIGUANS) AND TO SHOW A GREATER INTEREST IN
AND CONTRIBUTION TO MAURITIAN DEVELOPMENT AND PRO-
GRESS. PAST EXPERIENCE INDICATES THAT THERE ARE A
WEALTH OF WORTHWHILE SELF-HELP PROJECTS NEEDING
FINANCING IN MAURITIUS, AND THIS PROGRAM HAS ALWAYS
ENJOYED SOLID GOM SUPPORT.

(G) DEVELOP AT LEAST ONE MAJOR AID PROJECT PER YEAR --
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PORT L 00302 03 OF 03 310236Z

ON THE ORDER OF \$500,000 TO \$1 MILLION -- TO CONTRIBUTE
TO THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ASSIST THE
CURRENT GOM TO COPE WITH ONE OR MORE OF ITS SERIOUSLY
TROUBLED ECONOMIC SECTORS (E.G., HOUSING, TRANSPORT,
EDUCATION, THE PORT), AND TO PROVE THAT THE ENDING

OF OUR PL-480 FOOD-FOR-WORK PROGRAM DOES NOT MEAN A LESSENING OF OUR INTEREST IN THE COUNTRY'S PROGRESS. LSUCH A MAJOR (THOUGH MODEST) PROJECT COULD ALSO CONSTITUTE A "REWARD" FOR MAURITIUS' PARTICULARLY GOOD RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS (SEE LAST PART OF "OVERVIEW" ABOVE). A POSSIBLE FOCUS OF OUR RESTORED PROGRAM OF SIGNIFICANT (THOUGH HARDLY SUBSTANTIAL) BILATERAL ASSISTANCE WOULD BE THE DEPENDENT ISLAND OF RODRIGUES, WHICH OVER THE YEARS HAS BEEN NEGLECTED BY THE GOM AS WELL AS BY MOST DONORS OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. THOUGH RELATIVE TO THE POOREST COUNTRIES OF AFRICA MAURITIUS COULD BE CONSIDERED WELL ON THE WAY TO DEVELOPMENT, RODRIGUES AND ITS 30,000 PEOPLE TODAY ARE EASILY AS DISADVANTAGED AS THE MOST SERIOUSLY DEPRIVED AREAS ON THE CONTINENT. ALTHOUGH MAURITIANS MAY BE CONSIDERED TOO "RICH" FOR AID IN CARRYING OUT ITS CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE TO HELP THE POOREST OF THE POOR, THE RODRIGUANS WOULD QUALIFY UNDER THE LATTER DEFINITION OF WORTHY RECIPIENTS OF OUR ASSISTANCE. AN NEW MINISTRY FOR RODRIGUES HAS RECENTLY BEEN CREATED, HEADED BY A YOUNG DEPUTY WHO REPRESENTS THE ISLAND IN THE ASSEMBLY, AND IT APPEARS THE GOM MAY START MAKING UP FOR ITS PAST NEGLECT OF THE RODRIGUANS.

(H) PROMOTE U.S. INVESTMENT IN AND TRADE WITH MAURITIUS.

(I) PRESERVE MAURITIUS' ACCESS TO THE U.S. SUGAR MARKET AND REMAIN SENSITIVE TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ELEMENT OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS (IT BEING VITAL TO MAURITIUS). KEEP THE GOM CURRENTLY INFORMED ON THE CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PORT L 00302 03 OF 03 310236Z

U.S. SUGAR PICTURE AND SEEK THE GOM'S VIEWS BEFORE MAJOR DECISIONS AFFECTING ITS PRIME EXPORT ARE TAKEN.

(J) GIVE DUE REGARD TO MAURITIAN SENSITIVITIES ABOUT DIEGO GARCIA AND GREAT POWER MILITARY RIVALRY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, THESE BEING THE ONLY POTENTIAL MAJOR IRRITANTS IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE PRESENT GOM. KEEP THE GOM CURRENTLY INFORMED ABOUT PROGRESS IN REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON MUTUAL MILITARY RESTRAINT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

(K) MAKE MORE REGULAR BUT STILL DISCREET CONTACTS WITH A FEW OF THE PRINCIPAL FIGURES IN THE MAURITIAN MILITANT MOVEMENT, AS A CONTINGENCY AGAINST THEIR POSSIBLY COMING TO POWER IN THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO.

(3) ISSUES

THE AVAILABLE OPTIONS FOR ALL OF THE ISSUES (OR DECISION REQUIREMENTS) DESCRIBED BELOW ARE:

-- REJECT THE PROPOSAL AS UNWARRANTED; OR

-- REPROGRAM FUNDS TO COVER IT IN FY-78; OR

-- INCLUDE IT IN FY-79 BUDGET PROJECTIONS.

THIS POST FAVORS THE MIDDLE OPTION, THAT IS, IMPLEMENTATION IN FY78.

(A) STATE

(I) ASSIGN A SECOND CRO TO THE POST, IF AND AS REQUIRED BY INSTALLATION OF THE WATTS SYSTEM.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 PORT L 00302 03 OF 03 310236Z

(II) ESTABLISH A SIX-MAN MSG CONTINGENT, AS RECOMMENDED BY SY.

(III) INCREASE THE ANNUAL EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE ALLOCATION (CU) TO \$75,000, AS RECOMMENDED IN SECTION ABOVE, TO FINANCE 20 TO 25 INTERNATIONAL VISITORS PER YEAR.

(B) USIA

(I) INCREASE ANNUAL LEVEL OF USIA SUPPORT TO \$15,000 PER YEAR (\$10,000 DSA PLUS \$5,000 ADDITIONAL GOE FOR CULTURAL PRESENTATIONS) TO SUPPORT AN INCREASED INFORMATIONAL/CULTURAL EFFORT, IN CONNECTION WITH ESTABLISHMENT OF READING ROOM.

(II) INCREASE USIA ALLOCATION (GOE) FOR SALARIES OF TOW LOCAL EMPLOYEES WHO WILL ASSIST WITH INFORMATIONAL/CULTURAL PROGRAM TO \$7,000 PER YEAR, AS SUITABLE EMPLOYEES ARE NOT AVAILABLE AT CURRENT \$5,500 PER YEAR FUNDING LEVEL.

(C) AID

(I) INCREASE SELF-HELP FUNDS FOR MAURITIUS TO LEVEL OF \$60,000 PER YEAR, AS RECOMMEND ABOVE. (THIS PROPOSAL IS FOR AF BUREAU ACTION, AS THESE AID FUNDS ARE ALLOCATED BY AF.)

(II) RE-ESTABLISH AN AID PROGRAM FOR MAURITIUS WITH DEVELOPMENT LOAN FUNDS OF FROM \$500,000 TO \$1 MILLION

PER YEAR, AS RECOMMENDED ABOVE. NO AID PERSONNEL
REQUIRED TO ADMINISTER PROGRAM.
KEELEY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, ANNUAL REPORTS, CERP 0001
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 30-Mar-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977PORTL00302
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770109-0961
Format: TEL
From: PORT LOUIS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t1977036/aaaaafgb.tel
Line Count: 550
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: c737f8b7-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION AF
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 11
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 77 STATE 38356, 77 PORT LOUIS 252
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 08-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3110022
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PARM -- ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT -- PART I
TAGS: AMGT, PFOR, US, MP
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/c737f8b7-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009